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QUEST N. 10 - DISCUSSION

Maud S. Mandel, Muslims and Jews in France. History of a Conflict, (Princeton
and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2014) pp. 253.

by Bryan S. Turner
Before World War II Muslims were generally well integrated into European
societies. In Weimar Germany they were a well off and socially accepted
community, but this middle-class cohort of Muslims largely disappeared in the
aftermath of the War.1 It was not until 1977 that the concept of ‘Islamophobia’
was first defined in Britain by the Runnymede Trust to describe the nature and
scope of prejudice against Muslims and to recommend that the 1976 Race
Relation Act be amended to make discrimination on religious grounds unlawful.
This amendment was rejected by the government that argued that the Human
Rights Act of 1998 would provide sufficient protection of minorities.2 Perhaps
unsurprisingly after 9/11 there has been a growing literature on Islamophobia
indicating widespread hostility to and fear of Muslim communities in western
societies. There is even a view that the anti-Muslim discourse is rampant, in fact
constituting an ‘industry’ and that Islamophobia is simply an illustration of old
Orientalist myths.3 While Europe appears to be struggling with diversity as such,
Islam is thought to be a special challenge. In Can Islam be French? John Bowen
claims that Islam touches raw nerves in French culture.4 The entry of Islam into
public culture has changed the topography of France and raised old anxieties
about’ colonial repression, modern anti-Semitism, and the struggles between
Catholics and Republicans.’5 It is claimed that European hostility to Jews has
been replaced by the growing fear of Muslims.6
The mood of European scholarship with respect to the recognition and
integration of Islam is typically pessimistic. The rise of anti-immigrant and antiIslam political parties – Golden Dawn in Greece, the Northern League in Italy,
1
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Marine Le Penn and the National Front in France, and the English defense
league in Britain – have exposed a hitherto hidden or ignored under-current of
resentment against foreigners. In the context of these developments, Maud
Mandel’s study of Muslims and Jews in France is a welcome corrective to the
dominant focus on anti-Islam in the academic literature and in the popular
media. The historical picture is far more complex and contradictory, because,
despite religious conflicts around the world, Jews and Muslims often have shared
interests as a consequence of having a common experience as outsiders and
minorities. Her study is also somewhat unusual in that the dominant
comparison in the academic literature is between Christians as the majority and
Muslims as a minority.
There have been dramatic but mainly isolated attacks on Jews in France in the
1980s and in the 1990s, but anti-Jewish violence increased dramatically after 2000,
primarily fuelled by the resentment of Muslim youth from the most
disadvantaged sectors of French society. Tragic attacks on Jewish citizens in 2006
and 2012 caused further alarm for the authorities. Explanations of increasing antiSemitism or Judeophobia are diverse and often contradictory, but they have in
common the belief that Muslim and Jewish communities are on a collision
course that is inevitable and unavoidable. The purpose behind Mandel’s
historical study is to challenge such assumptions. She opens her discussion by
recording that she was originally drawn to the topic by observing the deep
cultural and historical connections that link these two communities rather than
dividing them. As a matter of fact, France has the largest Jewish and Muslim
communities – around four to six million Muslims and over half a million
Muslims – outside Israel. The pressures on these two communities, which share
certain linguistic and cultural traditions and a common experience of
displacement, to assimilate combined with feelings of rejection, are the same.
Mandel consequently wants to reject the dominant narrative that describes the
mutual hostility between Jew and Muslim, while also asking how far these
narratives engender the very violence they claim to describe. While there is no
deep and intractable enmity between actual Jews and Muslims, ‘Jew’ and
‘Muslim’ have become political symbols of conflict.
Thus her main thesis is that ‘binary constructions of Muslim-Jewish interaction
have worked to erase the more complex social terrain in which Muslims and Jews
have interacted in late twentieth century France’ (p.155). Writing about ‘Jews’
and ‘Muslims’ from an historical or sociological perspective raises considerable
difficulties, because these labels hide significant cultural, social and religious
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differences within the two categories. A further difficulty in defining and
contrasting religious identities is that, especially among youth, believing,
belonging and behaving ae no longer systematically connected.7 Perhaps one
criticism of the book is that, while she recognizes significant differences within
these communities, she does not describe these in any detail. So for example she
offers no analysis of the Shia –Sunni divide that intensified after the Iranian
Revolution into a global struggle for dominance. In the last decade the ShiaSunni conflict has largely defined not just the Islamic world but global politics in
general.8 Nevertheless, Mandel shows considerable sophistication in recognizing
that, while the labels obscure historical differences, what Jew and Muslims have
in common is their lived experience of both exclusion and successful efforts to
integrate. One further parallel between Jews and Muslims perhaps requires more
attention from Mandel, namely that Islam and Judaism, in contrast to Roman
Catholicism, have no transnational institutions of authority that are recognized
globally. In both communities, authority is very much devolved and at least in
the case of Islam local fatwas give expression to religious ‘de-territorialization’
and promote greater heterodoxy of belief.9

The historical unfolding of this narrative of a ‘clash of civilizations’ – a phrase
which she does not use – is closely connected with domestic political events such
as the 1968 student revolts, the 1980s experiments with multiculturalism and the
general economic decline of France by the end of the last century. However,
these domestic or national issues cannot be separated from the international and
global context, and above all by the complicated history of French Algeria. This
attention to the postcolonial is clearly not incidental or trivial and ‘From the
standpoint of demography alone, decolonization was monumental in the
historical trajectories of France’s Muslim and Jewish populations’ (p. 3). At least
one million French citizens were ‘repatriated’ as a consequence of the violence,
the number of Algerian Muslims grew from 130,000 in 1930 to over 600,000 by
1963. Between 1944 and 1979 there were 240,000 new Jewish arrivals. While the
increase in numbers was important, immigration also brought greater
community diversity between the new arrivals and those Jews that had roots in
7
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France stretching back before the French Revolution and those Jews who had
migrated from war-ravaged Eastern Europe.
These developments also began to differentiate Jews from Muslims on the
grounds that Jews were regarded as better educated, intelligent and more
‘assimilable’ than Muslims. The social differentiation was also juridical and the
sense that the 1870 Cremieux Decree had granted French citizenship to all
Algerian Jews thereby cutting them off decisively from most Algerian Muslims.
The Decree had been reinforced by various informal administrative practices and
schools of the Alliance Israelite universelle by which Jews came to enjoy better
life-chances than the Muslim population. Although after World War II
citizenship was granted to Muslims in the belief that it would dilute support for
the independence struggle, Muslims in France continued to experience
discrimination especially after 1954 when the struggle with the Front de
liberation nationale transformed Muslims into ‘the enemy within.’ Jews fleeing
from the Algerian conflict enjoyed the benefit of subsidies and aid that were
made available to repatriating citizens. These historical conditions of structural
discrimination had long term consequences in distinguishing between Muslims
who were socially and economically marginalized and immigrant Jews who
joined a French Jewish community with historical ties. Although Jews had been
profoundly traumatized by Vichy legislation during Nazi occupation of France,
by the 1950s, as a consequence of a determined rebuilding process, Jews had
access to a highly developed infrastructure. In addition to this institutional
support, there was a communal leadership committed to their integration and to
the defense of Jewish interests. As a result, the Jewish community had many
more opportunities to shape public opinion and to access the locus of political
power. Jews are unsurprisingly better educated, more economically successful,
and socially mobile than French Muslims. However, in one important respect
they have been unsuccessful in shaping French foreign policy with respect to
Israel and in discrediting public opinion about the plight of Palestinians.
These general observations about the modern history of Jewish-Muslims
relations set the scene for the six main chapters each of which considers a
moment in which Muslim-Jewish conflicts became a matter of official concern
for the French police, the media and the wide array of communal spokespersons.
Beginning in 1948 with minor unrest in Marseille, chapter 1 examines the ways in
which disagreements over Israel provided a channel for debates about
inequalities in French minority policies at home and in North Africa. Jews, who
were traditionally reluctant to express a visible ethnic politics in France, kept
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quiet about any Zionist sympathies they may have embraced. Chapter 2 explores
the link between French colonial policies and Muslim-Jewish relations in the
metropole and how decolonization changed the ways in which different actors
understood the character of Jewish belonging throughout the region. In
particular she considers how the invention of ‘the North African Jew’ united
Tunisian, Moroccan and Algerian Jews into a collective that was in conflict with
‘North Africans,’ ‘Arabs’ and ‘Muslims.’ In chapter 3 she examines how these
new ways of conceptualizing Muslim-Jewish interactions conditioned
integration into the metropole in the late 1950s and 1960s, and how these
possibilities for integration were compromised by the structural inequalities
between Muslim and Jew. In the context of considerable civil disturbance and
international instability around the 1967 Arab-Israeli war, chapter 4 shows that,
while conflict between Muslims and Jews was rare, the narrative of two
communities in conflict gained momentum and credibility. In chapter 5 the
notion of two polarized communities was underlined by a growing student
movement that connected radical left politics at home with the plight of the
Palestinians abroad. However, it was not until the 1980s that the idea of
polarization developed as the central motif for understanding relations between
Jews and Muslims. In chapter 6 (‘Particularism versus Pluriculturalism’) she
describes how the head-scarf controversy in October 1989, the desecration of the
Jewish cemetery in Carpentras in May 1990 and the outbreak of the first Gulf
War in January 1991put an end to joint activism and intensified identity politics.
France has as a result been deeply divided by the head-scarf controversy and the
presence of religious symbols in public schools. With the growth of Jean-Marie
Le Pen’s anti-immigration and nationalist agenda and increasing fear of terrorist
attacks, the policy of ‘the right to be different’ was replaced by a firmer emphasis
on ‘integration’. Public concern was directed towards the ‘second generation’ of
Muslim migrants who were identified with general delinquency and occasionally
with civil disturbance such as the burning of 250 cars and the wounding of seven
police men in Lyon in July and August 1981.These fears were intensified by the
Iranian Revolution in 1979 and the fear of a global jihad movement. It is worth
noting in passing that Muslims and Jews in France was published before the
Charlie Hebdo affair in 2015 and the growing threat of ISIS as an inspiration for
domestic terrorism.
Perhaps the principal intellectual lesson of this research is that understanding
domestic or national conflicts cannot be undertaken without a detailed and close
understanding of international politics. The national relationships between Jews
and Muslims since 1945 have been deeply influenced, but not wholly determined,
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by France’s relationship to Israel during the various wars that have erupted in the
region especially in 1948 and 1967. The depressing lesson of this excellent history
of social and religious pluralism in modern France is that these external conflicts
in the Middle East have contributed to the erosion of the official commitment to
‘pluriculturalism’ and, while French politics is deeply divided between left and
right, both agree that ‘immigration’ is a ‘problem ‘that needs an urgent solution.
The growing crisis of African refugees in the Mediterranean and millions of
displaced people from Syria has only served to strengthen opposition to
immigration across European societies. Given the economic and political crisis in
Greece, some Greek islands, most notably Lesbos, could be quickly
overwhelmed. The prospect of an international deal over Iran’s nuclear program
in 2015 further complicates the international environment and may in fact
provoke further conflict between Iran and Saudi Arabia on the one hand and
divide opinion in the West with respect to the security of Israel in the next
decade. While Jews and Muslims may not be on a collision course, it will require
considerable statecraft on the part of French leaders to create an environment in
which both communities feel safe and secure at home and abroad.
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